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Abstract: While the use of Internet Protocol (IP) in 
aviation allows new applications and benefits, it 
opens the doors for security risks and attacks. Many 
security mechanisms and solutions have evolved to 
mitigate the ever continuously increasing number of 
network attacks. Although these conventional 
solutions have solved some security problems, they 
also leave some security holes. Securing open and 
complex systems have become more and more 
complicated and obviously, the dependence on a 
single security mechanism gives a false sense of 
security while opening the doors for attackers. 
Hence, to ensure secure networks, several security 
mechanisms must work together in a harmonic multi-
layered way.  In addition, if we take QoS 
requirements into account, the problem becomes 
more complicated and necessitates in-depth 
reflexions. In this paper, we present the architecture 
of our QoS-capable integrated security gateway: a 
gateway that highly integrates well chosen 
technologies in the area of network security as well 
as QoS mechanisms to provide the strongest level of 
security for avionic data network; our main aim is to 
provide both multi-layered security and stable 
performances for critical network applications. 
Keywords: Integrated security gateway; session 
table; QoS; IPSec; VPN; firewall; NAT; IDS. 
1. Introduction 
Current commercial aircraft data networks are IP 
based [1]. These e-enabled networks not only allow 
passengers to access the Internet but also they have 
a lot of other benefits. The conversion toward e-
enabled aircraft encourages the use of new 
applications on-board the aircraft such as Electronic 
Flight Bag (EFB), enhanced In-Flight Entertainment 
(IFE), video surveillance and VoIP. However, the 
introduction of IP/TCP/UDP, SNMP and TFTP 
protocols inside the aircraft network exposes this 
sensitive system to new types of attacks [2]. Many 
security mechanisms and solutions have evolved to 
deal with the ever increasing number of network 
security attacks. Although these conventional 
solutions have solved some security problems, they 
also leave some security holes [3], especially when 
they are ineffectively combined. Besides that, the 
dependence on a single security mechanism such as 
firewalls will not provide a real secure network. 
Worst, Hackers have devised sophisticated attacks 
that easily circumvent traditional security 
mechanisms. Dealing with this issue, this paper 
presents the architecture of a QoS-capable 
integrated security gateway: a gateway that merges 
well-chosen technologies in the areas of network 
security and QoS to provide multi-layered security 
and ensure in-depth defence strategy that respect 
performance requirements and ensure availability of 
the critical traffic.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
in Section 2, we provide a survey of current network 
security mechanisms and highlight their strength and 
weaknesses. Section 3 presents the most relevant 
QoS mechanisms; Then, Section 4 presents our 
QoS-capable integrated security gateway. In Section 
5, we have adapted a case study to show how our 
gateway can protect avionic network. Afterwards, 
Section 6 briefly describes the related works. Finally, 
we draw some conclusions and perspectives for 
future work in Section 7. 
2. Conventional security mechanisms 
In this section we present some existing 
conventional security mechanisms. For each one, 
we provide a brief description and present the 
benefits and limitations. 
2.1 Firewalls 
Firewalls are network devices that filter network 
traffic at one or more of the ISO seven layers 
network model, most commonly at the network, 
transport, and application levels [4]. Basically, there 
are four basic types of firewalls: packet filtering 
firewalls (PFs), circuit proxy firewalls (CPFs), 
application proxies firewalls (APFs) and, the most 
widely used type, stateful inspection packet filtering 
firewalls (SPFs). We will briefly describe these 
techniques and present their pros and cons. 
Packet Filtering Firewall (PF): PFs were the first 
generation of firewalls. They are basically screening 
routers [5] that control the flow of data in and out of a 
network by looking at certain fields in the packet 
header: Source IP Address, Destination IP Address,  
Protocol identifier, Source port number, and
Destination port number.  
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The PF inspects all incoming and outgoing packets 
and applies the specified policy (e.g., drop, reject or 
accept the packets). 
PF was considered as an efficient, fast, and cost 
effective solution since a single router can protect an 
entire network. However, PF has a lot of limitations: 
it is based on IP addresses without any 
authentication; it cannot defend against man in the 
middle attacks and forged packets with spoofed IP 
addresses; it depends on port number for identifying 
communicating applications and this is not a reliable 
indicator because many current protocols such as 
network file system (NFS) use varying port numbers. 
But the most important limitation is the difficulty of 
writing correct filters [6] for complex and permanently 
evolving systems. Generally, filtering rules are far 
from providing perfect security against holes in the 
PF. 
Stateful Inspection Packet Filtering Firewall (SPF): 
While PF works by statically inspecting each packet 
against the rule set, SPF works not only by 
inspecting the packet headers but also by correlating 
the incoming traffic to the earlier outgoing requests 
[7]. Basically, SPF builds dynamic session table to 
record relevant information of each communication 
to trace the validity of each packet in these 
connections. SPF dynamically opens and closes 
ports according to the connection needs.  In this way 
it makes filtering and network management easier.  
While SPF can protect against some attacks that 
exploit weaknesses in the network level protocols, it 
cannot provide protection at the application level. 
Application defence require more awareness of the 
payload content. 
Circuit Proxy Firewall (CPF): These types of firewall 
work as relaying agents between the internal and the 
external hosts [8]. The idea is to protect internal 
hosts from being directly exposed to the outside 
world. The CPF accepts requests from internal hosts 
for connections to the outside world, destroys the 
original IP and transport layer header,  encapsulates 
the payload in newly constructed headers with their 
own IP addresses and finally sends the request with 
the changed IP to the outside server. In addition, 
CPF requires authentication before establishing 
connections. While CPFs can support large numbers 
of protocol as they do not have to understand 
application level protocols, they open security holes 
as they cannot provide defenses against some 
application level attacks. Moreover, they can allow 
malicious contents to be passed without filtering. 
Application Proxy Firewall (APF): APFs (also called 
application-level gateways) operate on Layer 7 of the 
OSI model. Like CPF, APF acts as an intermediary 
between internal and external hosts [9]. APF
provides all the services provided by CPF. In 
addition, APF is application level protocol aware. In 
this way, APF can inspect application level 
commands and discard malformed ones. The main 
drawback is that a separate application-proxy must 
be written for each application type being proxied. In 
addition, the applications must be modified to work 
with APF. Finally APF is not efficient against several 
malwares.  
  
2.2 Network Address Translation (NAT) 
NAT is an IETF [10] standard that enables a local 
area network (LAN) to modify network IP addresses 
and ports numbers in headers of datagram packets 
(in transit across a traffic routing device) for the 
purpose of remapping a given address space into 
another. One of the main objectives of NAT is to 
solve the scalability problem when the number of IP 
addresses allowed to access the external network is 
limited. From the security point of view, NAT more or 
less hides internal private network addresses from 
outsiders, enforces control over outbound 
connections, and restricts incoming traffics. 
However, even for these objectives, NAT is 
sometimes not very efficient and cannot provide 
defenses against malformed packets, application 
level attacks and malwares. 
2.3 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
A VPN [11] is a means of connecting to a private 
network using a tunnel over a public network, such 
as the Internet. VPNs can use authenticated links to 
ensure that only authorized hosts can connect to the 
private network, and can use encryption to ensure 
the confidentiality of the transmitted data. VPNs can 
be built at different layers with different protocols, 
e.g., L2TP (level 2), MPLS (level 2.5), IPSec (level 
3), SSL/TLS (level 4), SSH (level 5). In this section 
we will talk about IPSec and SSL/TLS, the most 
commonly used security protocols to carry out VPNs 
at layers 3 and 4 respectively.  
IPSec: IPSec is the de-facto standard for network 
security [12]. It can be seen as a framework that 
provides the following security services: (1) access 
control, (2) data origin authentication, (3) anti-reply 
integrity, (4) connectionless integrity, and (5) data 
confidentiality.  
However, with IPSec, it is difficult to exercise control 
on a per user basis on a multi-user machine as 
IPSec is implemented at the network layer. 
Moreover, IPSec cryptographic algorithms add 
overhead to the network and application traffic; 
hence the use of hardware accelerators is usually 
required. Furthermore, while IPSec can prevent 
some DoS attacks, it can’t stop all of them. Finally, 
IPSec protects the packet regardless of its content; 
this means that it does not protect against 
malformed headers or malicious contents. 
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Transport Layer Security (TLS / SSL): SSL stands 
for Secure Sockets Layer, though IETF has renamed 
it TLS (Transport Layer Security) [13]. 
TLS / SSL is a protocol that provides security 
services such as authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality on top of the Transport Control 
Protocol (TCP).  
TLS needs to maintain the context for a connection 
and is not currently implemented over the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), as UDP does not 
maintain any context. As this security mechanism is 
transport protocol specific, security services such as 
key management may be duplicated for each 
transport protocol. Another limitation of transport 
layer security is that the applications still have to be 
modified to request security services from the 
transport layer. Also, some TLS uses and 
configurations can be subject to some attacks such 
as man in the middle attacks. 
2.4 Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
A NIDS is a packet sniffer that passively inspects all 
inbound and outbound network traffic and notifies 
network administrators when it identifies suspicious 
patterns that may indicate an attack [14]. The two 
main categories of IDS detection algorithms are 
signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-
based IDS examines packets for well known attack 
signatures, while anomaly-based IDS detects 
unusual behavior, usually based on statistical 
methods. Signature-based IDSes are in general not 
capable of detecting new attacks, while anomaly-
based IDSes suffer form high rate of false alarms. 
Correlation techniques try to overcome these kinds 
of limitations but do not completely resolve IDSes 
limitations and issues. Note that IDSes are 
processing intensive. For this reason, they are 
generally placed in parallel with the data stream. The 
major limitation of IDSes is their inability to instantly 
drop suspicious packets or stop attacks as it is not 
placed in-line with the data stream. 
2.5 Intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
Unlike its predecessor IDS, IPS is placed in-line with 
the data stream [15]. The main aims are to actively 
analyze traffics and take protective actions like 
dropping suspicious packets and closing some ports 
(sources of attacks). The application specific 
integrated circuits (ASIC) [16] technology makes IPS 
processing much faster. IPS can reassemble the 
traffic stream and look at application commands to 
detect suspicious fields. However, IPS does not 
perform detailed analysis at the file level, which is 
required to detect the large number of malwares. 
2.6 Anti-Malware Gateway (AMG) 
A malware is a general term for software programs 
that have been designed with or can be used for 
malicious intent [17]. AMG is used to scan files, e-
mail attachments, and web pages objects against a 
large database of malware signatures. Generally, 
AMGes are time consuming especially if they are 
used to defend against a variety of malwares such 
as viruses, worms and Trojans. As with IDS / IPS, 
the main disadvantage of AMGes is that generally 
they cannot protect against 0-day and newly 
developed malwares and attacks which do not have 
a known and integrated signature. 
After discussing the state of the art of the commonly 
used security mechanisms, let us now deal with 
QoS-related mechanisms.  
3. Quality of Services (QoS) mechanisms 
QoS is a heavily loaded term with many different 
meanings depending upon the specific context. IETF 
[18] has defined QoS as nature of the packet 
delivery service provided, as described by 
parameters such as achieved bandwidth, packet 
delay, and packet loss rates. In this paper, we focus 
on QoS mechanisms such as priority classification, 
rate limiting as well as queuing and scheduling. 
3.1 Priority classification 
The main goal of QoS is to provide priority including 
dedicated bandwidth, controlled jitter and latency, 
and improved loss characteristics. A QoS policy 
should identify what priority level to be given for each 
traffic flow. After that, classification algorithms [19] 
can be used to inspect each packet and mark it with 
its associated priority level. For example, high 
priority traffic such as VoIP should be served before 
non-priority one such as e-mail or FTP packets. 
3.2 Queuing and Scheduling 
Queues represent locations where packets may be 
held (or dropped). Packet scheduling refers to the 
decision process used to choose which packets 
should be serviced or dropped. Buffer management 
refers to any particular discipline used to regulate the 
occupancy of a particular queue. Packets will be 
placed in different queues according to their priority 
levels. Afterwards, schedulers will pick packet to be 
served according to their priorities. The most 
important objectives of scheduling are computational 
efficiency and fairness [20]. In this work we depend 
mainly on two scheduling algorithms: CBQ (class-
based queuing) and LLQ (low latency queue). CBQ 
provides fine granularity of bandwidth sharing and 
traffic priority control [21]. It divides a network 
bandwidth among multiple queues or classes. Each 
queue has a traffic assigned to it, based on source 
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or destination address, port number, protocol, etc. 
Queues are also given a priority, so that, those 
containing high priority traffic are processed ahead 
of queues containing low priority traffic. LLQ [22] 
creates a low latency queue dedicated to real time 
applications traffic. LLQ serves highly delay sensitive 
real time traffic faster than the other queues.  
3.3 Rate limiting 
Rate limiting is used to control the rate of traffic sent 
or received over a network interface [23]. Traffic that 
is less than or equal to the specified rate is sent, 
whereas traffic that exceeds the rate is simply 
dropped or delayed. 
Variations of token bucket algorithms are used to 
control network traffics. A token bucket algorithm 
[24] uses the analogy of a bucket to control the rate 
of requests. A bucket has a size (B), which 
corresponds to the number of tokens that may fit into 
the bucket. The size of the bucket also corresponds 
to the maximum burst size. Each request that comes 
in consumes some tokens from the bucket. When no 
more tokens are left in the bucket, the request 
cannot be processed currently and must either be 
rejected or queued. Tokens regenerate at a rate (R), 
which corresponds to the maximum average 
sustained rate of traffic. In any interval (t), a 
maximum of (B + Rt) tokens may be consumed. This 
allows for bursty output behavior while constraining 
the average throughput. 
4. QoS-CAPABLE INTEGRATED SECURITY 
GATEWAY ARCHITECTURE 
As cited above, each of the previously mentioned 
security mechanism has its own limitations. Since we 
cannot depend on a single mechanism to protect our 
networks, the need for an integrated solution has 
become a must. Besides that, most of the existing 
applications such as embedded avionic networks 
have both security and QoS requirements, while 
current solutions only deals with one of these 
requirements. In this section, we present the 
architecture of our QoS-capable integrated security 
gateway; a security gateway that homogeneously 
and efficiently merges the most relevant security and 
QoS mechanisms to provide in-depth layered 
security solutions with appropriate QoS mechanisms 
; the aim is to ensure not only availability, integrity, 
confidentiality of critical network traffics but also 
achieve temporal constraints. In fact, this integrated 
solution satisfies easy and cost effective security and 
QoS management, and fast response. 
Figure 1 represents the architecture of QoS-capable 
Integrated Security Gateway. Solid arrows represent 
data flow while doted arrows represent control flow. 
The architecture of our secure and QoS-aware 
gateway consists of the following units: 
Figure 1: QoS-capable Integrated Security Gateway 
Architecture. 
4.1 Filtering, Network Address Translation, and 
Classification (FNATC) unit 
Linked to the network interface, this component can 
be considered as the first layer of defense in our 
architecture. It receives all incoming packets and 
offers three main functions: firewall filtering, NAT 
translation, and QoS classification. Traditionally, 
theses functionalities are achieved separately, which 
causes redundant steps and hence more processing 
time.  Conversely, in our view, since these three 
functions and routing depend heavily on searching 
and classification algorithms to identify which flow 
the packet belongs to, we merged them into a single 
unit to improve the performance.  In this way, we will 
not repeat the classification task for each function; 
we only classify one time and the result of our 
classification is used for firewall filtering, NAT 
translation, QoS classification and routing. To 
achieve this goal, we built an integrated session 
table. 
Integrated session table: Figure 2 shows the 
architecture of the integrated session table; due to 
column wide space limitation the table is divided into 
two parts.  
Session ID NAT info. 
Lan 
addr 
Lan 
port 
Ext  
addr 
Ext  
port 
Proto Gwy 
addr 
Gwy 
port 
Stateful 
filtering info. 
QoS Routing info. 
State 
… 
Time DSC
P 
Ext- next- 
hop 
Lan-next- 
hop 
Figure 2: Integrated session table architecture. 
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The first five fields of the table constitute session ID. 
Lan-addr and lan-port are the internally private 
source IP address and source port number while ext-
address and ext-port are external communicating 
host destination IP address and destination port 
number. Finally, proto field is the protocol identifier 
that is used to refer to the transport layer protocol in 
use. These five fields are used to identify traffic flow. 
The second part of the table contains NAT 
information necessary to perform mapping between 
LAN private address and Gateway public address. 
gwy-addr and gwy-port are the NATed publicly 
available address and port number.  
For stateful filtering, session state (such as 
sequence number and TCP flags) and session time 
out are stored in state and time fields.  
For QoS classification, the QoS DSCP [25] priority 
value will be stored in the DSCP field. 
For routing, ext-next-hop field will be used to send 
the packet to the next destination -outside the 
protected network. While lan-next-hop, field will be 
used to send the packet to the next destination 
inside the protected network. 
Figure 3: Integrated session table processing. 
Figure 3 represents the integrated session table 
processing. For incoming packet, the session table 
will be searched. If there is no entry in the session 
table, this means that it is the first packet in this 
session. So first, the packet will be validated against 
the filtering rules. If it is allowed to pass, an entry in 
the session table will be added; then NAT translation 
will be performed to make the necessary mapping 
between external and internal addresses. After that, 
QoS classification will be performed and the DSCP 
will be added to its field in session table. 
Finally routing table will be searched to obtain the 
next hop values. 
If an entry is found in the session table (ongoing 
packet) the packet will be inspected to ensure its 
conformance to the session state and all the needed 
session processing (NAT, QoS priority classification, 
and routing decision) will be performed in one shot 
without further research overhead, as all the needed 
information is available from the single lookup in the 
short session table. In addition, hashing function is 
used to accelerate session table lookup; this is 
clearly a great enhancement which save processing 
time and increase performance. 
The worst case session table look up time is O(log 
s); where s is the number of session table entries. It 
is very low if compared with the worst case linear 
search time  needed to perform the four functions, 
T= O(f) + O(n)+ O(c)+ O(r); where f, n, c, and r are 
the lengths of  filtering, NAT, classification and 
routing tables and rules entries. This clearly gives 
processing gain and enhances the performance.                        
Packet filtering sub-unit: The Stateful Inspection 
Packet Filtering Firewall (SPF) sub-unit inspects all 
incoming and outgoing packets; if it is identified as 
the first packet in the connection, SPF will be 
obligated to search a large set of access control 
rules (stored in the centralized policy database) to 
decide if the packet is allowed to enter the protected 
network. The SPF keeps state information (such as 
TCP sequence number, window size and flags) for 
all current connections and least recently rejected 
connections in the integrated session table. For any 
packet that belongs to existing connection, only the 
session table will be searched to ensure that the 
state of the packet is in accordance with a legal 
connection. SPF is responsible for detecting all types 
of network level attacks (i.e., flooding, spoofing, 
etc.). SPF performs IP defragmentation and protocol 
normalization to detect and remove ambiguity [26]. 
Actually, Packet defragmentation is also needed for 
proper functioning of NAT component. If a 
suspicious packet is detected, it will be dropped and 
in some cases the connection will be blocked and 
logged.  
NAT sub-unit: In this architecture, NAT will be 
provided as optional service to protect internal 
network addresses from exposure to external world. 
NAT will translate internal private IP addresses to 
their associated public addresses and vice-versa. 
Clearly, any incoming packet that has not internally 
associated address will be dropped and logged in 
the central log (another component of the 
architecture) for further auditing. After establishing a 
connection, the NAT associated internal and public 
addresses are kept in the integrated session table to 
make ongoing processing of current connections 
faster. 
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Classification sub-unit: Each accepted packet must 
be classified and given a QoS priority level. This 
priority level will affect the treatment of the packet. 
Basically, high priority packets such as VoIP packets 
will be served faster than low priority packets such 
as e-mail packets. Different queuing and scheduling 
algorithms (such as CBQ and LLQ) are used to 
achieve this goal. As we mentioned before, the QoS 
priority value will be stored in the integrated session 
table to make its retrieval performed in single search 
process as described above. 
4.2 VPN unit 
If the packet is cryptographically protected by IPSec, 
it will be sent to the IPSec VPN specific module for 
cryptographic processing. In our architecture, to 
allow adequate classification of IPSec encrypted 
packets; we had designed and implemented Q-ESP 
(QoS-friendly Encapsulated Security Payload) 
protocol [27]. Q-ESP is a security protocol that, not 
only provides the same security services provided by 
IPSec ESP and AH simultaneously, but also allows 
QoS classification. QoS classification is not allowed 
by the IPSec ESP protocol as it encrypts transport 
layer header, which contains necessary fields 
needed for QoS classification. To overcome this 
limitation, and to give network control devices the 
ability to classify IPsec encrypted traffic, the Q-ESP 
protocol copies the source and destination port 
number from the transport layer protocol header and 
place them in clear (without encryption) in its own 
header. Figure 4 represents Q-ESP packet format in 
IPv6. 
Figure 4: Q-ESP packet format in IPv6. 
Moreover, in order to ensure a higher level of 
availability, we expect using a hardware support 
where the Q-ESP processing will be carried out in 
full line speed. 
After applying the concerned cryptographic 
processing and extracting the protected packet. The 
packet will be sent to the FNATC unit for processing. 
4.3 Meter and rate controller unit 
To ensure stable state of the traffic and to guarantee 
the fair sharing of the network bandwidth, we 
suggest using a meter and rate controlling unit to 
monitor and control the traffic. This component is 
placed just after FNATC unit, as it will monitor and 
control the flow of accepted, NATed and classified 
packets. Basically, a “rate controller” is a policer 
which controls and limits the throughput rate to 
exactly what the flow can send and receive. The 
meter makes the necessary accounting process and 
notifies the monitoring unit about the state of the 
whole traffics or specific flow. In this way, we call on 
a QoS mechanism to satisfy the availability security 
property; in fact, with meter and rate controller, we 
can detect some DoS traffic that behaves abnormally 
(trying to consume network resources) early and 
more easily. More precisely, while the meter can 
detect such abnormal traffic, the rate controller can 
prevent it.  
To illustrate this, let us take the case where a mal- 
behaving unit (due to system failure) starts sending 
traffic that may saturate the network bandwidth. 
Even if it may succeed in consuming the bandwidth 
allocated for this traffic flow, it will not be able to 
affect the bandwidth allocated to other traffic. Hence, 
this can effectively protect the overall network 
infrastructure. Note that the level of granularity in 
applying bandwidth management is a critical factor. 
Finer assignment of bandwidth will naturally help to 
ensures more control over the network resources but 
may incur more management overhead. Actually in 
avionic networks per flow specification is performed, 
calculated and simulated offline to ensure safe and 
secure operation of the flight. 
4.4 Application Proxy Firewall (APF) 
By contrast to IDS, APF uses a positive security 
model. Rather than trying to define every possible 
bad thing that could occur, they “learn” legitimate 
application behavior on the fly, ensuring that every 
user request conforms to expected application usage 
and that only valid traffic is passed to backend 
servers. In addition, APF performs user 
authentication to prevent non-authorized users from 
accessing protected applications.  
APFs act as a proxy between users and 
applications; each sent request will be intercepted 
and analyzed to ensure its proper conformance with 
the pre-specified rules and command signatures. 
Malformed commands will be rejected.  
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APF examines control and data fields within the 
application flow to verify that the actions are allowed 
by the security policy and do not represent a threat 
to end systems. By understanding application-level 
commands and primitives, they can identify content 
out of the norm and content that represents a known 
attack or exploit.  
4.5 Intrusion detection System (IDS)  
This system performs deep packet inspection. The 
IDS uses two inspection engines: signature-based 
and anomaly-based. Both engines have access to 
the central log file and can analyze its content to 
make correlations. Both engines log their activities 
and eventually notify administrators for some specific 
and critical attacks. In the avionic context, we can 
imagine an architecture where the IDS sensors are 
located within the Passenger network (PN), crew 
network (CrN), and the control network (CoN). In 
addition, another sensor would be located within the 
aircraft access network to ascertain if malicious 
traffic is introduced into the CrN and/or the CoN.  
SPADE (Statistical Anomaly Detection Engine) is an 
example Snort pre-processor plug-in that is adapted 
to avionic networks [28]. The anomaly detection 
engines supplement the classical Snort attack 
signatures. SPADE assigns anomaly scores to 
packets. The anomaly score is based on the 
observed history of the network. The fewer times 
that a particular kind of packet has occurred in the 
past, the higher its anomaly score will be. Moreover, 
SPADE maintains a probability table that reflects the 
occurrences of different kinds of packets in history, 
with higher weight for more recent events. It 
calculates a raw anomaly score directly from the 
probability of anomaly.  
4.6 Monitoring and adaptive unit 
This unit monitors the internal state of the gateway 
and enforces adaptive actions if necessary. The 
monitoring unit contains the central log and the 
integrated policy database. This unit intercepts all 
logged activities and analyses them. It may also 
receive information about the state of the protected 
network. It manages and enforces the cooperation 
between the different units in the gateway. For 
example, when IDS detects an attack, it logs the 
action and notifies the monitoring and adaptive unit. 
Based on this notification, the unit will modify SPF 
rules to drop all packets from this connection. 
Furthermore, the adaptive unit can dynamically 
change the VPN cryptographic key lengths to shorter 
keys, in case of heavy traffic load, to gain some 
processing time; inversely, it may change the keys to 
be longer to give more security protection. Hence, to 
provide dynamic control with adaptive solutions, the 
central policy database has been constructed in this 
unit. It is an integrated policy repository which 
contains QoS, NAT, VPN, and all security. 
4.7 Administrator interface 
It is a graphical user interface that enables 
administrators to set policies and perform auditing 
tasks. It should be scalable and flexible enough to 
allow administrators to add custom rules or new 
signatures. The added policies should be verified off-
line to be conflict free. Policy conflict occurs when 
the objectives of two or more policies cannot be 
simultaneously satisfied. For more details about 
conflict detection and resolution refer to [29]. In 
addition, the interface should include analysis tools 
(such as SEC [30]) to enable powerful auditing of the 
central log. 
5. Case study: Securing Avionic data network 
In this section we present a case study in which our 
solution has been adapted to protect the avionic 
data network  
5.1 Aircraft Data Network Architecture   
As shown in figure 5, the on-board avionic network is 
divided into four main domains [31]: 
1. Aircraft Control Domain:  contains the flight and 
embedded control system where the aircraft is 
controlled from the flight deck, and cabin core 
system, which provides environmental functions 
dedicated to cabin operation, such as 
environmental control, passenger address, 
smoke detection, etc. 
2. Airline Information Service Domain: provides 
operational and airline administrative information 
to both the flight deck and cabin. It also provides 
information to support the passengers. 
3. The Passenger Information and Entertainment 
Service Domain:  provides In Flight Entertainment 
(IFE), Internet access and support for passenger 
owned devices. 
4. Passengers owned Devices Domain (PDD): 
contains the passenger’s owned laptops and 
digital personal assistant devices. 
In some next generation and future avionic 
architectures, each of these networks may require 
connectivity with each other and with ground-based 
computing networks. The Common Network 
Interconnects is used to connect the different sub-
networks with Ground Networks. These links can be 
shared with appropriate care to QoS and security 
considerations. Furthermore, it is clear that inter-
domain connections require a security perimeter at 
the border of the connected domains, incorporating 
network routing, QoS and security services. 
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5.2 The proposed solution 
First, it is worth noting that, avionic network uses 
VLAN between the aircraft domains and the smart 
switch; the aim is to provide each domain access 
only to those links that can support the associated 
class of traffic. The aircraft control domain uses 
“Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet” (AFDX), 
further limiting the ability for intrusion by a non-
configured user.  
Second, we propose to place our QoS capable 
integrated security gateway at the border of each 
sub-network domain. Our aim is to protect each 
domain from external attacks while respecting the 
QoS requirements. Figure 5 shows the location of 
our gateway inside the avionic network.  
Figure 5: The use of QoS-capable integrated 
security gateway (Q-ISG) in the avionic network 
Figure 6 illustrates the complete packet processing 
flows of the QoS-capable integrated security 
gateway. Incoming packets will be processed as 
follow: 
When the FNATC unit receives the packet, the rule 
set will be verified to see if this connection is 
accepted, If the packet is part of a VPN (i.e., is 
protected by Q-ESP or AH) it will be dispatched to 
the VPN module for cryptographic processing. In our 
case the VPN must use a hardware accelerator that 
works in the full line speed to prevent the possibility 
of denial of service and to reduce processing delays. 
After extracting the protected packet, the VPN 
module sends it to the FNATC unit.  
Non-cryptographically protected packet will be 
handled as follow: the state table will be searched to 
see if there is an entry for this connection or not, if 
there is no entry in the state table, this is the matter 
with the first packet in a connection; thus the rule set 
will be verified to see if this connection is accepted, if 
the packet is accepted, an entry will be added in the 
state table for this connection and the need 
information to perform NAT will be added. After that, 
the QoS priority level will be identified and added to 
the same entry in the state table. If the packet is not 
allowed, it will be dropped and logged in the central 
log. For example, if the packet does not have 
internally associated address, it simply will be 
dropped and logged in the central log for further 
auditing. 
If the packet is not the first one in the connection, an 
entry will be found in the state table and all the 
needed information to perform the state inspection, 
NAT mapping, QoS priority assignment and routing 
will be available. Note that contrarily to existing 
solutions, these information are available only after 
four different steps while (in our solution) they are 
extracted in only one step; which is a great saving in 
processing time and space. SPF will inspect the 
packet to ensure that the state of the packet is in 
accordance with a legal connection. If a suspicious 
packet is detected, it will be dropped and logged. In 
our case packet fragmentation is not allowed so that 
all communicating parties must respect the 
announced maximum transmission unit MTU. In this 
way, we prevent all attacks based on fragmentation 
and save the de-fragmentation time. 
According to the associated priority level the packet 
will be placed in the suitable queue for further 
processing. For example, high priority traffic such as 
flight control command will be placed in the LLQ to 
be served before any other traffic as it has the 
highest priority.  
Figure 6: complete packet processing flows of the QoS-capable integrated security gateway.
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Accepted packets will be forwarded to the meter and 
rate control unit to measure it and to ensure that it is 
within the specified limit. Flow that exceeds the 
allocated limits will be dropped, in this way; 
misbehaving units that send out of limit traffic or 
perform denial of service attacks will not affect other 
traffic. After that the packet will be directed to the 
concerned APF and a copy of the same packet will 
sent in the same time to the IDS. In our case, IP
routing between interior and exterior networks is 
completely disabled, and all desired services (e.g. 
SNMP, TFTP and other applications) are provided 
by APFs. They will first authenticate users trying to 
connect to these services. Furthermore, the APFS 
will inspect applications commands and data to 
ensure their safety. All types of files that may contain 
malicious contents such as .exe, .com and .doc are 
prohibited. Only files that known to be saver such as 
.txt and .bmp are allowed   finally, if all the previous 
steps succeeded, the packet is forwarded to its 
destination.  
Our IDS is protocol specification aware. First, the 
application level protocol is identified, and then, the 
packet is inspected against the set of rules and 
signatures associated with this protocol. Moreover, 
both anomaly and signature based engines could 
inspect the packets and the central log to make 
correlations. Any signs of attacks will be alarmed. 
Trace out mechanism is used to identify the source 
of attack. 
In our case the policy database will contain different 
policies; each one is suitable for a specific context. 
For example, the aircraft has different operational 
mode: some activities which are allowed when the 
aircraft is in the flight mode may not be allowed 
when the aircraft is in the maintenance mode. 
Consequently, the monitoring subunit will monitor the 
state of the aircraft and notify the adaptive subunit of 
each change in the aircraft state. Based on the state 
information, the adaptive subunit will enforce the 
suitable policy in each context. 
The administrator interface will be used to set 
policies and modify rules. The system can detect any 
conflict between policy rules and could suggest other 
alternatives to resolve this conflict. It is a helpful tool 
to assist the administrator in setting conflict-free 
policies. 
Furthermore, the central log will be available to the 
administrator for further analysis and investigation 
with the aid of the log analysis tool. 
While flying, a synchronized copy of the log file will 
be sent to the flight controller in the airport. This will 
give the ability for corrective actions and make e-
enabled aircraft safer. 
6. Related work 
While a lot of research have been done in the area 
of security mechanisms, little research have been 
carried out in the area of integrated security gateway 
with QoS requirements. In our context, we deal with 
both security and QoS requirements and 
mechanisms.  
 AEEC [31] has suggested reference security model 
for communication between the networks of different 
security levels in the aeronautical networks. The 
described security gateway contains packet filtering 
firewall, IPSec VPN and application proxy firewalls. 
Like our model all internally protected services are 
provided only through APFs. In comparison to our 
work this model does not consider the use of QoS 
mechanisms (i.e., meter and rate controller) to 
prevent DoS attacks and ensure availability. 
Although they considered the uses of packet filtering 
firewall, it is not clear if it is a stateful one or not, 
while in our work we show the importance of this 
type of filtering firewall and extended its session 
table to accelerate the processing of other important 
functions (NAT, QoS classification, and routing). This 
actually gives a great chance to enhance 
performance. In addition, we suggested the use of 
IDS to the purpose of on line detection and trace out 
of attacks and their sources. More over, we used 
monitoring and adaptive unit to manage the overall 
gateway security and QoS policy in an adaptive way 
and to provide central log for further auditing.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we presented the conventional network 
security mechanisms and we have identified their 
limitations. Since we cannot depend on a single 
security mechanism to protect our network, we have 
shown the architecture of our QoS capable 
integrated security gateway. This architecture 
provides multi-layered protection and implements 
QoS mechanisms to ensure proper functioning of the 
gateway. This architecture can benefits greatly from 
advancement in hardware technology such as ASIC 
and coprocessors. Actually, we had started a kernel 
based implementation of the architecture; both 
IPSec Q-ESP VPN and FNATC components were 
implemented successfully. Currently we are 
completing the implementation phase and optimizing 
our code. The next step is to perform security and 
QoS performance evaluation experiments to show 
the soundness of this architecture. As additional 
perspectives, we will search how to integrate the 
QoS capable integrated security gateway with 
distributed intrusion detection sensors. Further work 
is also needed to integrate the gateway QoS and 
security policies with the overall system policy. 
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